Abstract
Introduction
In a recent speech to the General Assembly of the United Nations the Russian Federation's representative maintained that the NATO-led multinational force stationed in the territory of Bosnia-Herzegovina ('IFOR/SFOR') 1 lacked the power to arrest persons Indicted by the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (the Tribunal). He stated that planned operations leading to those arrests could not be described as 'cooperation' with the Tribunal, nor could they be considered 'support' for the Tribunal's activities. He further asserted that these operations were not within the remit of the multinational force. 2 The purpose of this paper is to determine whether the Russian Federation's view is legally sound or whether, instead, it is at odds with the relevant international instruments. Clearly, should the Russian position prove to be the correct one, the recent arrests by SFOR troops in Bosnia and Herzegovina must be regarded as legally unwarranted.
3
In accordance with Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Security Council of the United Nations, acting under Chapter vn, authorized the Member States to send for a period of approximately one year a multinational Implementation force (IFOR) in order to fulfil the role specified In Annex 1-A and Annex 2 of the Peace Agreement (SC Res. 1031, adopted on 15 December 1995). In Resolution 1088 of 12 December 1996 the Security CoundL again acting under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter, authorized the Member States to continue deploying a multinational Implementation force In the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina and to establish for a period of 18 months a multinational stabllixation force (SFOR) as the legal successor to IFOR.
The multinational force includes NATO and non-NATO states and operates under the authority and subject to the direction and political control of the North Atlantic Council through the NATO chain of command (see Article I. para. 1(6), of Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace In Bosnia and Herzegovina). The Russian Federation's representative held that 'planned actions for the armed capture of suspects' cannot be described 'as "cooperation'' with the Tribunal or as "support" for the Tribunal's activities, particularly wtthln the framework of the International peace-making operation which Is being carried out In Bosnia and Herzegovina'. He also stated that 'such deliberate actions are not in the mandate of the multinational stabilisation forces, as denned by the peace agreement' and that '[e]ven during the talks on the conditions for Russia's participation. [Russia] objected to an Interpretation of the mandate that would endow the multinational forces with police functions'. See Speech of the Representative of the Russian Federation to the Plenary Session of the United Nations Assembly on the Report of the International Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia (Item 49 on the Agenda). 4 November 1997 (unofficial translation). On 10 July 1997, for the first time. SFOR carried out an operation leading to the arrest of Milan Kovacevtc. charged with complicity in the commission of genocide. According to press reports, on 17 December 1997 SFOR troops arrested two other inHUMf in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
2 The Possible Source of the Power of the Multinational Force to Arrest Persons Indicted by the International Tribunal
The multinational force has been deployed to ensure, inter alia, the implementation of Annex 1-A to the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia-Herzegovina. 4 The Annex constitutes an agreement concluded by the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina, Republika Srpska and the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and covers the military aspects of the peace settlement It grants the multinational force extensive powers, which, however, do not explicitly Include the right to execute arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal. Some commentators have argued that the right of IFOR/SFOR troops to arrest persons accused by the Tribunal can be inferred from the mandate given to IFOR/SFOR to take 'such actions as required, including the use of necessary force, to ensure compliance' with Annex 1-A.
5 Article X of this Annex provides that [t] This argument is not altogether convincing. The multinational force has been granted the authority to ensure that the parties to the Annex comply with their duty to cooperate with the Tribunal. This does not mean that the multinational force has the right to replace the parties whenever they fail to undertake an action required for them to cooperate with the Tribunal. Arguably, if one of the parties failed to arrest an accused, the action carried out by the multinational force leading to the arrest of this person would not ensure compliance with Article X of Annex 1-A by the party concerned. Instead, it would be an action carried out by the multinational force to substitute for the recalcitrant state or Entity.
Be that as it may, two important implications of the argument under discussion deserve close attention. The first implication follows from the content of the sweeping obligation laid down in Article X of Annex 1-A: the parties are duty-bound not only to execute the arrest warrants issued by the Tribunal, but also to put into effect any order or request advanced by the Tribunal. Consequently, the argument at issue would justify not only the authority of the multinational force to execute arrest warrants; it would also Justify the right of the multinational force to substitute for the parties in the execution of any other order or request issued by the Tribunal. For example, if one of the parties refused to comply with an order concerning the production of specific evidentiary documents, the multinational force would be legitimized to carry out actions leading to the acquisition of those documents, even by resorting to armed force.
The second implication of the argument is that any action by the multinational force aimed at ensuring compliance with an order of the Tribunal would be subject to a condition: namely, the failure of the party concerned to execute that order. In other words, IFOR/SFOR would not be endowed with a general power to enforce compliance with a Tribunal order; it would be entitled to execute an arrest warrant or any other order only if faced with a breach, by Bosnia and Herzegovina or one of the two Entities, of their obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal.
It Is submitted that a more persuasive legal basis for the exercise, by the multinational force, of the power of arrest may be found in Article VI, paragraph 4, of Annex 1-A. This Article provides: Arguably, Article VI. para. 4, grants the North Atlantic Council (and consequently the multinational force) sweeping powers which, in accordance with para. 5, can be exercised by resort to military force. However, the 'additional duties and responsibilities' that the North Atlantic Council may grant to the multinational force ex Article VI, para. 4 are not unfettered. They find a significant limitation in the content of the obligations undertaken by the parties in Annex 1-A. These obligations cover matters such as the cessation of hostilities (Article II), the withdrawal of foreign forces (Article HI), the redeployment of the forces of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and of the two Entities (Article IV), and so on. It follows that, for example, the North Atlantic Council could not authorize IFOR/SFOR to arrest common criminals or to organize political elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
On 16 December 1995 the North Atlantic Council adopted a resolution which inter alia provided that It is submitted that the decision at Issue is consistent with the two aforementioned provisions and is therefore intra vires the Annex. Clearly, the power of arrest represents an additional responsibility which may be exercised by resort to force. In addition, the execution of arrest warrants constitutes a task which is within the purview of the obligations assumed by the parties under Article X of Annex 1-A.
The suggested legal construction leads to conclusions which are radically different from the implications of the legal view considered above. First of all, the power of arrest could be exercised by IFOR/SFOR concurrently with that of the Republic of Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two Entities making up this state. To put It differently, the multinational force would be entitled to execute arrest warrants even If the parties were willing to comply with their obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal.
Secondly, the range of 'additional duties and responsibilities' accruing to the multinational force In relation to cooperation with the Tribunal would need to be specified on an ad hoc basis by the North Atlantic Council. In other words, the multinational force would be entitled to fulfil only those 'additional responsibilities' which are explicitly provided for In a resolution of the North Atlantic Council. With regard to cooperation with the Tribunal so far the North Atlantic Council seems to have established only the power of arrest as an additional responsibility of ' Emphasis added. 10 Emphasis added. It Is worth noting that the North Atlantic Council did not state that IFOR 'shall' or 'may' detain Indictees. The choice of the word 'should' seems to indicate both the absence of an obligation proper and a strong invitation to IFOR to execute arrest warrants. Also on the basis of this Rule it is argued that, in an area of Bosnia and Herzegovina under the 'jurisdiction or control' of the multinational force, the particular member state of IFOR/SFOR having armed forces in control of that area would be obliged to execute the arrest warrant transmitted by the Tribunal to the multinational force under Rule 55 (B) . 13 This argument is open to two objections. First of all, under a fundamental principle of international law. restated in the 1969 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, an international obligation is binding upon a state within the state's own territory, Including the territory over which the state may de facto exercise exclusive jurisdiction.
14 This principle also applies to the obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal imposed by Security Council Resolution 827 (1993) and undertaken by the parties to Annex 1-A through Article X. Consequently, this argument would be See Jones, supra note 7, at 239: Flga-Talamanca, The Role of NATO In the Peace Agreement for Bosnia and Herjegovlna', 7 E/H, (1996) 164. esp. at 171-175: Ambos, supra note 7. at 888. Emphasis added. See the authors cited supra note 11. In particular, see Jones, supra note 7. at 239. who argues that the duty of IFOR to execute arrest warrants 'derives from the Tribunal's Rules and the overriding obligation of all States to comply with the Tribunal's orders pursuant to Resolution 827 (1993). If an accused "resides, or was last known to be. or is believed by the Registrar to be Ukery to be found" In an area of Bosnia and Henegovina under IFOR's "Jurisdiction or control", then an arrest warrant may be transmitted under Rule 55 of the Rules to the national authorities of the State in control of that sector, which are then under a duty to execute It For example, the United States contingent of the IFOR currently has responsibility for the operational area which Includes Srebrenica. If the Registrar believed an accused to be In Srebrenica, she could send an arrest warrant to the appropriate authorities of the United States, which would then have the duty to execute the arrest warrant' (notes not reported). Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides that when there is no Indication of the parties' Intentions as to the territorial scope of a treaty, the general rule is that the application of the treaty extends to the entire territory of each party. admissible only if it were to be assumed that the states participating in the multinational force exercised such a degree of control over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina as to set aside and replace the sovereign authority of that state and the jurisdiction of the two Entities. This assumption, however, is highly questionable. Were the assumption correct, it would follow that Bosnia and Herzegovina and the two Entities would be in actual fact unable to fulfil their obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal for lack of control over their territory. A better view is that the multinational force does not exercise de facto exclusive jurisdiction over the territory of Bosla and Herzegovina, even if it has been granted extensive powers. Therefore, states contributing troops to IFOR/SFOR are not bound to comply with the obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal beyond the limit of their territory, in particular in the territory of Bosnia Herzegovina.
15
A second reason for rejecting the argument at issue is that, in any case, control over the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina is not exercised by individual troopcontributing states qua states. Rather, this control is exercised by the multinational force as such, pursuant both to the treaty obligations undertaken by the parties in Annex 1-A and to the relevant resolutions of the Security Council. Neither treaty provisions nor Security Council resolutions impose upon IFOR/SFOR the obligation to execute arrest warrants. 16 Without such an express obligation one can hardly contend that the multinational force has a duty to arrest persons indicted by the Tribunal.
Final remarks
In the light of the above, the contention is warranted that the legal view propounded by the Russian Federation's representative in the General Assembly of the United Nations is flawed. The multinational force has undoubtedly the authority to arrest persons indicted by the Tribunal. This authority stems from a resolution of the North Atlantic Council of 16 December 1995, which in turn is arguably grounded on a treaty provision, namely Article VI, paragraphs 4 and 5, of Annex 1-A to the General For the same reason it cannot be contended that the obligation established by each of the four Genera Conventions of 1949 'to search lor persons alleged to have committed, or have ordered to be committed ... grave breaches, and [to] bring such persons, regardless of their nationality, before [their] own courts' Is binding upon the troop-contributing states with regard to the territory of Bosnia and Herzegovina. As a result the argument according to which the aforementioned conventional undertakings oblige the states participating In the multinational force to arrest persons charged with grave breaches of the Geneva Conventions must be refected. This argument has been elaborated upon by Jones, supra note 7. at 239-240. The obligation to cooperate with the Tribunal, which Includes the obligation to execute arrest warrants, has been Imposed upon the United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia (UNTAES) by SC Res. 1037 Res. (1996 . Under para. 21 of this Resolution 'UNTAES shall co-operate with the International Tribunal In the performance of Its mandate. Including with regard to the protection of the sites tdrntlflrd by the Prosecutor and persons conducting Investigations for the International Tribunal'.
Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina.
17 Under these Articles, the North Atlantic Council is entitled to confer upon the multinational force additional powers aimed at ensuring cooperation with the Tribunal.
Whilst it has the authority to arrest persons accused by the Tribunal, neither IFOR7SFOR nor states participating In the multinational force appear to be obliged to execute arrest warrants. Such a duty can only be imposed by a Security Council resolution: alternatively, it can derive from a conventional undertaking between NATO and the competent authorities of Bosnia and Herzegovina.
It Is submitted that the legal view advanced in this paper is based on a proper Interpretation of the relevant International instruments. These instruments reflect the position of the major powers involved in the efforts to restore peace in the former Yugoslavia. The states which brokered the Dayton Peace Agreement and played a major role in Its negotiation and drafting intended to grant NATO forces very extensive powers. However, they did not immediately confer on them a wide range of specific powers, including the power to arrest indictees. They preferred to lay down a blanket provision by virtue of which in future the North Atlantic Council, in light of the relevant factual circumstances, could grant additional and specific powers to the multinational force, as soon as the need for such powers arose. On 16 December 1995 the North Atlantic Council provided for the attribution to the multinational force of the power of arrest of persons indicted by the Tribunal. It did so with circumspection, both by using non-mandatory language ('should detain... person who come into contact with IFOR') and by limiting to the arrest of indictees the enforcement authority of the multinational force in matters relating to cooperation with the Tribunal.
This decision of the North Atlantic Council may of course be strengthened In future, should the Council deem it advisable to extend SFOR powers concerning cooperation with the Tribunal to other matters, or even to grant SFOR troops the power to seek out indictees for the purpose of arresting them. 
